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 51 
50 YEARS WAS TOO LONG TO WAIT: THE SYRIAN REFUGEE 
CRISIS HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A SECOND 
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING 
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 
Major Yvonne S. Brakel,* Rachel E. Kester, and Samantha L. Potter** 
I. INTRODUCTION – THE WORLD AND ITS LAW WERE NOT READY FOR THE 
SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 
President Trump stated “we don’t want them here”1 as he signed an ex-
ecutive order barring travelers from seven predominantly Muslim countries 
for at least 90 days and refugees from anywhere in the world for at least 120 
days.2 He assured the American public that this order was not a Muslim ban, 
but instead, was a move intended to “keep radical Islamic terrorists out of 
the United States of America.”3 With that official act, he kept his campaign 
promise and halted former-President Obama’s commitment to welcome 
110,000 refugees into the United States in fiscal year 2017.4 The effects of 
his order were instant and highly criticized by voices across the globe. With-
in hours, the headlines were flooded with stories of refugees being denied 
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 1. Jeremy Diamond & Steve Almasy, Trump’s Immigration Ban Sends Shockwaves, 
CNN (Jan. 30 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-executive-order-
immigration-reaction/. 
 2. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). This order has since been 
replaced with the President’s most recent executive order, 13780. 
 3. Diamond & Almasy, supra note 1. 
 4. Juliet Eilperin, White House Raises Refugee Target to 110,000, WASH. POST (Sept. 
14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/14/white-house-
plans-to-accept-at-least-110000-refugees-in-2017/?utm_term=.58adfbf37619. 
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boarding onto the flights that should have delivered them to their new lives 
in the United States.5 
Among the hundreds of Syrian refugees who found themselves strand-
ed following issuance of President Trump’s executive order, were Rafiq al-
Saleh and his family.6 After Syrian airstrikes began targeting civilians in 
Aleppo, Rafiq and his then-pregnant wife Ghada Dibo made the difficult 
and dangerous decision to flee their home in Syria.7 They escaped with their 
two young children to Jordan, moving through the desert at night to avoid 
detection.8 After two years of waiting in Jordan, Rafiq, Ghada, and their 
three children were accepted for resettlement in the United States.9 Having 
plane tickets in hand and a new home waiting for them in upstate New York, 
they sold all their possessions and prepared to embark on a journey to a 
place where Rafiq said there is “democracy and freedom.”10 At the time his 
story was published on NPR, he had never met an American, but his friends 
who resettled in the United States assured him that there “you feel like you 
are a human being — a citizen. You have rights. No one can oppress you. 
Even the children have rights.”11 With one stroke of a pen, President Trump 
may have changed Rafiq al-Saleh’s feelings about the United States forever. 
Hours before they were scheduled to embark upon their journey to ‘democ-
racy and freedom,’ he and his family were told they could not board their 
flight to New York.12 Devastated, Rafiq began hoping for salvation in an-
other country. He heard that Canada had offered to take in the Syrian refu-
gees who had been approved for resettlement in the United States. “Maybe 
they will let us go to another country — to Europe or Canada.”13 
It is natural to get lost in the emotion of the refugee stories, but one 
must also remember the catalyst behind President Trump’s immigration 
order. The violent attacks in Paris and Brussels were carried out by members 
of the Islamic State who managed to infiltrate the migration of Syrian refu-
gees.14 Recall also the boasting of an Islamic State commander, “[w]e have 
 
 5. Jane Arraf, Trump’s Immigration Ban Has Left Syrian Family Stuck in Jordan, NPR 
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/02/512998371/trumps-immi
gration-ban-leaves-syrian-family-stuck-in-jordan. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Arraf, supra note 5. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Anthony Faiola & Souad Mekhennet, Tracing the Path of Four Terrorists Sent to 
Europe by the Islamic State, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/how-europes-migrant-crisis-became-an-opportunity-for-
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sent many operatives to Europe with the refugees . . . Some of our brothers 
have fulfilled their mission, but others are still waiting to be activated.”15 
After watching the news coverage of bloody terrorist attacks throughout 
Europe, the Middle East and the United States, fear of an uncontrolled mass 
migration of refugees is understandable. But, President Trump’s order did 
not just stop an uncontrolled migration of Syrians into the United States. It 
stopped the controlled resettlement of refugees who had completed an ex-
tensive screening process lasting anywhere between 18 and 24 months be-
fore even being approved to enter the United States.16 Prior to President 
Trump’s election, the Obama administration was also heavily criticized for 
accepting a limited number of Syrian refugees for resettlement.17 And, the 
United States was not alone. Many of the rich Gulf States and close neigh-
bors to Syria, including Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bah-
rain, do not accept Syrian refugees.18 Nor do Russia, Japan, Singapore, or 
South Korea.19 Eastern Europe, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Estonia have taken 
steps to reduce the influx of Syrian refugees. Hungary, perhaps the most 
extreme case, has built a border fence to keep refugees seeking asylum out.20 
The fundamental right to seek asylum21 is recognized in multiple hu-




 15. Marc Thiessen, ISIS Is Smuggling Terrorists Among Syrian Refugees, NEWSWEEK 
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/how-isis-smuggles-terrorists-among-syrian-
refugees-453039. 
 16. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, US Resettlement Facts, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/588a14fc4 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
 17. Jordan Fabian, NY Attack Hangs over Obama Push for Action on Refugees, HILL 
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/296739-ny-attack-hangs-over-
obama-push-for-action-on-refugees. 
 18. Facts & Figures: Syria Refugee Crisis & International Resettlement, AMNESTY INT’L 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/facts-figures-syria-refugee-
crisis-international-resettlement/. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Rick Noack, This Map Helps Explain Why Some European Countries Reject Refu-
gees, and Others Love Them, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/08/this-map-helps-explain-why-some-european-countries-
reject-refugees-and-others-love-them/?utm_term=.e66b9341ce01. 
 21. “An asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In coun-
tries with individualised procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet 
been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum 
seeker will ultimately be recognised as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum 
seeker.” What’s the Difference Between a Refugee and an Asylum Seeker?, AMNESTY INT’L 
AUSTL. (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org.au/whats-the-difference-between-a-refugee-
and-an-asylum-seeker/. 
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Rights22 and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.23 The 
1951 Convention, which was created in response to the mass influx of Euro-
pean refugees following WWI and WWII, attempted to create a “compre-
hensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international level.”24 
Though it remains the cornerstone of the international refugee regime, the 
1951 Convention has several shortcomings. The Convention does not re-
quire states to grant asylum, nor does it specify how states are to share the 
burden of refugee resettlement.25 As a result, the world is left with a patch-
work of domestic refugee laws and policies, which increase regional insta-
bility and security concerns posed by the current refugee crises. 
With no true burden-sharing requirements on the international commu-
nity, states of first asylum26 are left alone to bear the cost of protracted refu-
gee situations. Further complicating the problem, the refugees are oftentimes 
exposed to abject poverty and deplorable living conditions, placing them at 
risk of exploitation, radicalization, violence, injury, and illness. The United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 
currently 65.3 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide,27 21.3 of whom 
are refugees, meaning they have left their country seeking refuge in another 
state.28 Despite numbers that surpass those following WWII, only a small 
number of states are carrying the current weight of world’s refugees. 
A Second Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention is needed to create 
a predictable and equitable refugee resettlement plan among the internation-
al community. Section II discusses the current international treaties relevant 
to refugees, including a discussion of individual rights and state duties under 
the 1951 Convention on Status of Refugees and the 1967 Optional Proto-
col.29 After highlighting the limited duties imposed upon states, the authors 
will illustrate the inconsistent state practices of a handful of states in Part 
III.30 In Part IV, the authors will then explain that the patchwork of immigra-
 
 22. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. Article 14 specifically provides refu-
gees the right “to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” 
 23. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
189 U.N.T.S 150 (July 7, 1951) [hereinafter Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. First states of asylum are those countries that are geographically close to the conflict 
and will, solely based on their proximity, face the initial brunt of any mass refugee move-
ments. In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, the first countries of asylum are Turkey, Jor-
dan, and Lebanon. 
 27. Forcibly displaced persons include 21.13 refugees, 40.8 internally displaced persons, 
and 3.2 asylum seekers. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: 
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015 2 (2016), http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
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tion policies poses a significant threat to both regional and international se-
curity.31 In light of those threats, a Second Optional Protocol to the 1951 
Convention is needed to promote efficient and fair resettlement of refugees. 
Part V of this paper will explain how the Optional Protocol could distribute 
the refugee burden across many states, as well as addressing the obvious 
obstacles to concluding a binding international agreement.32 Finally, Part VI 
provides a conclusion.33 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
“CONSIDERING that the Charter of the United Nations and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the 
General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall 
enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination . . .”34 
The current legal framework of the international refugee regime 
acknowledges the fundamental right to seek asylum. The key documents 
establishing and reiterating this right include the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and its Op-
tional Protocol.35 Together these agreements establish some basic protec-
tions that must be afforded to refugees and asylum-seekers; however, the 
existing regime affords states significant discretion in their interpretation of 
obligations. 
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Following the devastation of the Second World War, the international 
community vowed to prevent similar atrocities from occurring in the future. 
In addition to the newly drafted UN Charter, world leaders wanted a sepa-
rate document highlighting fundamental human rights common to individu-
als around the globe.36 Representatives from 18 nations with culturally di-
 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See infra Part V. 
 33. See infra Part VI. 
 34. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23. 
 35. Many other instruments discuss the right to asylum. For example, the Convention on 
Rights of the Child (CRC) reinforces children’s rights to asylum. The CRC was developed to 
recognize the serious injustices children faced, as well as their particularly special needs. 
Stemming from the UDHR and the 1951 Convention, Article 22(1) requires that state parties 
take appropriate measures to ensure that children who are considered refugees or are seeking 
refugee status shall receive protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of appli-
cable rights, whether accompanied by their parents or not. However, similar to the other 
Conventions, protections are still limited in the name of state sovereignty. 
 36. History of the Document, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-
declaration/history-document/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2017). 
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verse backgrounds drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
10 December 1948.37 The UDHR marks a milestone in the evolution of hu-
man rights and represents the global interest of protecting basic standards 
for the dignity and rights of individuals. 
Among the many rights acknowledged in the Declaration, Article 14 
provides that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution.”38 Alternative language guaranteeing the right to 
be granted asylum was rejected by many participating states as an infringe-
ment upon sovereignty.39 The result of that change continues to plague in-
ternational refugee laws and customs to this day. The UDHR provides a 
basic right to individuals, yet states are given significant discretion when 
interpreting and defining their responsibility toward refugees and asylum 
seekers. As Christian Joppke explains, “states are not just free to grant, but 
also to prescribe, the conditions under which asylum is to be enjoyed.”40 
Unfortunately, subsequent agreements have not corrected this inconsistency. 
B.  The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Optional 
Protocol 
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights acknowledged the 
basic right to asylum, the mass increase in refugees post-WWII showed that 
more legal guidance was needed. In 1946, the United Nations created the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO),41 a “resettlement agency” for 
displaced persons.42 The IRO was given control over the “legal and political 
protection of persons who are its concern.”43 In an attempt to inform future 
international refugee efforts, the IRO requested the creation of a comprehen-
sive study of the history of refugee policy from the time of the League of 
Nations to the current IRO efforts. This study, A Study of Statelessness, out-
lined the aspects of statelessness, which included travel, personal status, 
education, reciprocity, expulsion, taxation, among other concerns.44 At the 
conclusion of the study, the IRO recommended the creation of a new inde-
pendent agency dedicated to protecting stateless persons when national 
 
 37. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22. 
 38. Id. at art. 14 (outlining the right to seek asylum).   
 39. Christian Joppke, Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States, 
Germany and Britain, in CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE: IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 109, 110–111. (1998). 
 40. Id. at 111. 
 41. G.A Res. 62 (I), (Dec. 15, 1946). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Gilbert Jaeger, On the History of the International Protection of Refugees, 83 INT’L 
REV. OF THE RED CROSS 727, 732 (2001). 
 44. Id. at 733. 
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agencies cannot.45 After considering the results of the Study of Statelessness, 
the Economic and Social Council authorized the creation of an ad hoc com-
mittee with the purpose of investigating refugees and stateless persons,46 
thus beginning the negotiations to create a universal document outlining the 
rights of refugees and the responsibilities of high contracting parties to sup-
port these rights. 
After nearly a year of negotiations and thirty-five committee meetings, 
the Convention on the Status of Refugees came into force on 28 July 1951.47 
This Convention was designed to be the “universal international instrument 
for the protection of refugees.”48 It was the first document to specify the 
rights afforded refugees while emphasizing the duties agreed upon by the 
High Contracting Parties.49 As drafted, the Convention restricted refugee 
status to persons whose circumstances had come about “as a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951,” “events occurring in Europe,” or “events 
occurring in Europe or elsewhere.”50 As the world refugee situation evolved, 
so did the law. In 1967, the Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention en-
tered into force and removed both the temporal and geographic re-
strictions.51 Thus, all refugees were granted equal status under the definition 
of the Convention, irrespective of time or nationality.52 
1. Rights Afforded to Refugees 
The 1951 Convention established the internationally recognized defini-
tion of a “refugee,” the principle of non-refoulement, and a multitude of 
rights afforded to refugees.53 Article 1A(2) states that a refugee is a person: 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun-
try; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
 
 45. Id. at 735. 
 46. Id. at 735. 
 47. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 
1951: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A COMMENTARY BY DR. PAUL WEIS 
(1990), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-
travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 4–5. 
 51. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23. 
 52. G.A Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 53. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23. 
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former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.54 
The cornerstone protection provided to refugees under the 1951 Con-
vention is the principle of non-refoulement as expressed in Article 33. This 
principle protects asylum-seekers or refugees from being returned to a coun-
try “where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”55 Protection against refoulement is afforded to all persons unless 
they have been deemed a danger to the security of the country, or having 
been convicted of a particularly serious crime, and considered a danger to 
the community.56 The Convention also provides a variety of other important 
rights to refugees. For example, Article 31 ensures that Contracting States 
will not impose penalties on those who enter a country illegally to seek asy-
lum. It further prohibits Contracting States from restricting the movements 
of refugees unless those restrictions are necessary to fulfill the refugee ap-
plication process.57 Article 32 maintains that Contracting States “shall not 
expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national securi-
ty or public order.”58 The Convention also protects refugees’ rights to educa-
tion, employment, and access to justice. 
2. Duties Agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties 
While the Convention provided numerous protections, including the 
critical obligation of non-refoulement, the drafters left it to the states to de-
cide which refugees they would allow to resettle in their countries.59 
“[S]tates remain under no obligation to grant to refugees asylum in the sense 
of lasting protection against the exercise of jurisdiction by another state and 
an opportunity to integrate themselves indefinitely in the state of refuge.”60 
Further complicating the matter, the Preamble highlights the potential for 
unequal burdens posed by refugees in specific regions and calls all nations 
to co-operate,61 yet what that cooperation should consist of is not addressed, 
described, or defined anywhere in the Convention. 
Respect for state sovereignty also places limits on the amount of sup-
port states are required to provide to the Office of the United Nations High 
 
 54. Id. at art. 1, A(2). 
 55. Id. at art. 33. 
 56. Id. at art. 33.2. 
 57. Id. at art. 31.1, 31.2. 
 58. Id. at art. 32. 
 59. James C Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 89, 100 
(2007). 
 60. GUY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (1983). 
 61. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, preamble. 
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).62 Article 35 of the 1951 Convention 
also calls upon states to undertake to cooperate with the UNHCR in the ex-
ercise of its functions.63 Recognizing the duty of the Office of the High 
Commissioner to make reports to the UN on issues of its concern, the Con-
vention also asks states to undertake to provide with requested statistical 
data concerning the condition of refugees, the implementation of the Con-
vention and any laws, regulations, and decrees relating to refugees.64 Unfor-
tunately, protection of state sovereignty has created an inconsistent patch-
work of national refugee laws and policies across the globe, which in turn, 
has led to an inequitable distribution of the burden posed by the current ref-
ugee crisis and poor quality protections provided to the world’s 65.3 million 
displaced persons. 
The existing international refugee regime firmly establishes the princi-
ple of non-refoulement, but it fails to place specific obligations upon states 
governing the grant of asylum or sharing the burden of refugee resettlement. 
As a result, individual states are left free to pursue their own agendas, which 
are often guided by short-term self-interests rather than equitable goals en-
shrined in the spirit of the current framework. 
III. INTERNATIONAL PATCHWORK OF STATE REFUGEE LAWS AND POLICIES 
“CONSIDERING that the United Nations has, on various occasions, 
manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure 
refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and 
freedoms . . .”65 
The Syrian refugee crisis has highlighted significant deficiencies in the 
international refugee regime. Without a binding obligation to grant asylum 
or assist with the equitable resettlement of refugees, states are free to decide 
their own asylum laws and policies. As a result, there are dramatically dif-
ferent domestic approaches to accepting asylum-seekers and refugees, most 
of which do not necessarily afford the “the widest possible exercise” 66 of the 
fundamental right to asylum envisioned by the Convention. First, the refu-
gee policies found in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, the states of first asy-
lum, and how their laws and policies have adapted with the crisis are dis-
cussed. Then, the authors will explore immigration policies in a handful of 
 
 62. The General Assembly established the UNHCR in 1951. Its two principle functions 
include ensuring international protection to refugees under its competence and seeking dura-
ble solutions for refugees in cooperation with state governments. See G.A. Res. 428 (V), 
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Dec. 14, 1950). 
 63. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, at art. 35. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at Preamble. 
 66. Id. 
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countries removed from the Syrian crisis, both geographically and in politi-
cal response to the crisis. The list of countries discussed is intended to be 
representative of the greater international community but is by no means 
exhaustive. The states of first asylum for the Syrian refugee crisis have be-
come overrun with refugees and, as result, more than one million of the ref-
ugees have opted to seek asylum in Europe. Despite regional agreements, 
Europe’s asylum policies also vary dramatically and, similar to those in the 
states of first asylum, have changed rapidly in response to the recent flood 
of refugees. 
A. The States of First Asylum 
The states of first asylum67 for the Syrian refugee crisis are Syria’s bor-
dering neighbors—Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. These three nation states 
bear a high burden of the crisis, together taking in over 4 million of the es-
timated 5.9 million Syrian refugees. While these states have shown great 
generosity toward the Syrian refugees, each has sought to restrict the mas-
sive influx of refugees with a variety of administrative, legal, and physical 
barriers at times throughout the conflict.68 
1. Turkey 
As of February 2017, it was estimated that Turkey had accepted 2.9 
million Syrian refugees, more than double the number taken by Lebanon, 
the second greatest receiver of Syrian refugees.69 Turkey is a party to the 
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees; however, it has not ratified the 
1967 Optional Protocol thus limiting its definition of a refugee to European 
asylum seekers.70 Turkey implemented its international obligations under the 
Convention through the Turkey Settlement Act (TSA) and, more recently, 
the Law on Foreigners or International Protection (LFIP). The TSA grants 
 
 67. States of first asylum are the first safe countries that refugees reach. See Ariane 
Rummery, Greater Support in Countries of First Asylum Needed to Stem Refugee Outflows, 
UNHCR (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&skip=
819&docid=55ddd2c86&query=greater support in countries of first. 
 68. Human Rights Watch, Syria: Events in 2016, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw
.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria#634b1d (last visited Mar 29, 2017). 
 69. Syria Regional Refugee Response Data, UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrian
refugees/regional.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 70. States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-
parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2018). 
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persons of Turkish descent and culture eligibility for settlement in the coun-
try and possible citizenship.71 
In early 2011, the Turkish government tried to convince Syrian Presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad to engage in reforms that could have contained the 
militarization of the Syrian uprising. 72 After that attempt failed, Turkey took 
a clear stance against the Assad regime and opened its borders to fleeing 
Syrians providing humanitarian assistance to civilians and internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) inside Syria.73 While the Syrian nationals were not 
recognized as refugees under Turkish law, Turkey did consider the incoming 
Syrians “guests” deserving of temporary protections.74 In 2013, Turkey cre-
ated the LFIP which allows non-European refugees limited protection under 
one of several types of temporary status—”conditional refugee status, hu-
manitarian residence permit, or temporary protection”– allowing them to 
remain in the country until a long-term place of settlement outside Turkey is 
determined.75 The LFIP also protects the Syrians against refoulement.76 
In recent years, however, Turkey has significantly restricted its policy. 
Since March 2015, Turkey has maintained a closed-border policy prohibit-
ing entry of all but seriously injured Syrian refugees.77 Implementing this 
policy has been two-fold: first, Turkey has focused efforts on the construc-
tion of a planned 511 kilometer concrete wall along its border;78 second, 
Turkish border guards have pushed back thousands of Syrians, forcing those 
fleeing violence and persecution to either continue their perilous journey for 
asylum elsewhere or return to their war-torn homeland.79 Those returned to 
Syria are often forced to seek shelter in dangerous Syrian border displace-
ment camps or hide in man-made ditches along the Syrian-Turkish border.80 
Asylum-seekers who have resisted Turkey’s push-back have faced severe 
 
 71. Wendy Zeldin, Refugee Law and Policy: Turkey, LIB. OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2016), 
https://www./law/help/refugee-law/turkey.php. 
 72. See Souad Ahmadoun, Turkey’s Policy Toward Syrian Refugees: Domestic Reper-
cussions and the Need for International Support, 47 SWP COMMENTS 1 (2014). 
 73. Id. 
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punishments. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch, Turkish 
border guards have killed at least five Syrians and seriously injured approx-
imately 14 others who tried to cross the border into Turkey.81 
The Turkish government defends its decision to close its borders and 
promotes the creation of a “safe zone” within Syria to which people can 
seek refuge. In July 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Tur-
key said that “cleansing the region of all threatening elements and establish-
ing a safe zone constitutes the basis of 1.7 million Syrian refugees’ return.”82 
The same month, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the foreign minister, said that, “[w]hen 
areas in northern Syria are cleared of the [ISIS] threat, the safe zones will be 
filled naturally . . . People who have been displaced can be placed in those 
safe areas.”83 Unfortunately, attacks on numerous Syrian “safe zones” have 
proven his assessment inaccurate.84 
In March 2016, Turkey marginally altered its closed-border policy by 
signing an agreement with the European Union that forced all new irregular 
migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands to be returned to Tur-
key.85 For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, the 
EU agreed to resettle another Syrian living in Turkey to a European nation.86 
2. Jordan 
Jordan houses upwards of 1.1 million refugees, including 658,000 Syr-
ians, but is neither a party to the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol.87 
Under its domestic laws, there is no distinction between foreigners and refu-
gees.88 In 1998, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
UNHCR, which improved protections for refugees within its territory.89 Pur-
suant to the MOU, Jordan accepted the 1951 Convention’s definition of 
“refugee” 90 and agreed to respect the principle of non-refoulement.91 The 
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UNHCR also gained the ability to provide assistance to the refugees located 
in Jordan.92 
In response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan initially had an open-
door policy with the Syrian refugees.93 Syrian nationals were exempted from 
visa requirements ordinarily required by Jordanian law.94 Unfortunately, as 
the number of refugees in Jordan dramatically increased so did the strain on 
its already limited resources and water.95 These economic pressures led to 
changes in refugee policies, including restrictions on the occupations availa-
ble to the Syrian refugees.96 It was ultimately security threats that finally 
ended Jordan’s open-door policy. In June 2016, Jordan sealed its borders to 
Syrian refugees after a suicide bomber attacked the entry point at Rukban, 
killing seven Jordanian military members and injuring 14 other personnel.97 
As a result, there are an estimated 60,000 Syrians living in make-shift camps 
along the border in an area designated by Jordan as an official “military 
zone.”98 The Jordanian military does not permit humanitarian aid workers 
into the military zone because it has been infiltrated by ISIS and is unsafe.99 
Aid workers fear that the people stuck in what they call a “no man’s land” 
are in danger of starvation.100 
3. Lebanon 
The UNHCR estimates that there are almost 1 million Syrian refugees 
currently living in Lebanon.101 Similar to Jordan, Lebanon is not a party to 
the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol102 and has not enacted any domes-
tic legislation specifically addressing the status of refugees.103 Refugee sta-
tus is determined by the provisions of a 2003 MOU between Lebanon and 
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the UNHCR.104 Under the terms of the MOU, the Lebanese government 
agreed to issue a temporary residence permit to asylum seekers and the 
UNHCR works to find durable solutions for the refugees.105 
Despite its MOU with the UNHCR, Lebanon has reversed its 
longstanding open-door policy for Syrian nationals. In 2015, it began impos-
ing visa-like restrictions on Syrians106 and has closed its border with Syria 
on and off since 2013.107 In 2016, newly elected president, Michel Aoun, 
called for Syrians to return to Syria despite the ongoing conflict.108 Aoun 
and other political leaders in Lebanon have also supported the creation of 
safe zones in Syria where refugees could return.109 
B. Europe 
With limited prospects in the states of first asylum and closing borders, 
a wave of Syrian refugees migrated into Europe in high numbers, either tak-
ing the Balkan Route110 or the risky journey across the Mediterranean Sea.111 
In 2015 alone, it was estimated that more than one million migrants and 
refugees arrived in Europe hoping to be granted asylum there.112 European 
leaders are divided on how best to respond to the sudden influx of human 
beings and took varying approaches to the crisis.113 Some European coun-
tries opened their doors to the refugees without limits; other countries lim-
ited the number of refugees they were willing to accept; and a number more 
took measures to close their borders to refugees all together.114 
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Twenty-eight of the forty-four European countries115 are members of 
the European Union. Since 1999, the European Union (EU) has worked to 
reform its asylum legislation to establish a Common European Asylum Sys-
tem (CEAS).116 Under the CEAS, protection is granted to migrants who 
meet the criteria of a refugee based upon a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.117 Subsidiary protection status is granted to migrants who do not meet 
the refugee criteria but face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned 
to his or her country of origin.118 The CEAS is made up of several directives 
and regulations that require action by the EU Member States or are directly 
applicable within their national legal systems. New rules have recently been 
adopted by the parties, establishing standards and cooperation to ensure that 
asylum seekers are treated equally throughout the EU.119 
Despite efforts to create a consistent body of protections throughout the 
EU, the Union was not prepared for the current refugee crisis and significant 
division exists as to the best and most equitable way to resettle the refu-
gees.120 The next section will discuss Hungary, the United Kingdom, and 
Germany to illustrate the range of responses found in Europe and, more spe-
cifically, the EU, Hungary, and the United Kingdom took protective 
measures to slow the influx of refugees. Adding to the chaos, Germany 
opened its doors without placing limits on the number of refugees they were 
willing to accept, causing a mass migration through the maze of open and 
shut states to the German border.121 
 
 115. UNSD — Methodology, UNSTATS.UN.ORG, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology
/m49/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
 116. European Commission, Common European Asylum System, EUROPA.EU, https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en (last updated Mar. 31, 2018). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. These revised regulations include the revised Asylum Procedures Directive, which 
aims for fair and efficient asylum decisions; the revised Reception Conditions Directive, 
which ensures humane reception and respect for fundamental rights of the asylum seekers 
across the EU; the revised Qualification Directive which clarifies the grounds for granting 
international protection; the revised Dublin Regulation which enhances the protection of 
asylum seekers during the process of establishing the state responsible for examining the 
application and clarifies the rules governing the relations between states; and the revised 
Eurodac Regulation that allows law enforcement access to the EU database of the fingerprints 
of asylum seekers under strictly limited circumstances in order to prevent, detect or inves-
tigate the most serious crimes, such as murder and terrorism. See id. 
 120. Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylum-
european-union (last updated Dec. 2016). 
 121. Rick Noack, Germany Said It Took in More than 1 Million Refugees Last Year. But 
It Didn’t, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews
/wp/2016/09/30/germany-said-it-took-in-more-than-1-million-refugees-last-year-but-it-
didnt/?utm_term=.b2c3e1bba421. 
66 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
1. Hungary 
Hungary’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis is possibly the most 
criticized by other members of the EU and human rights groups. In 2015, 
Prime Minister Viktor and members of the Hungarian Cabinet declared a 
state of emergency.122 The government installed razor wire fences on its 
borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop the flow of thousands of refugees 
and reinforced its borders with soldiers and police.123 Government officials 
also instituted harsher penalties for illegal crossings, including jail time.124 
Hungary is party to the 1951 Convention and the Optional Protocol.125 
They are also a member of the EU126 and bound by the CEAS. Despite its 
commitments under the Dublin Regulation,127 Hungary passed new legisla-
tion in March of 2017 authorizing the detention of asylum-seekers on its 
borders until their applications are processed.128 Pending decision on their 
cases, the asylum-seekers will be held in border camps and not be permitted 
to move freely about the country. If they choose to leave Hungary, they are 
only authorized to leave through a border gate to Serbia, a non-EU country 
where the asylum-seekers cannot benefit from the Schengen agreement 
which allows for free movement throughout Europe. 129 
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2. The United Kingdom 
Despite its longstanding role in the development of international hu-
man rights law and commitment under the 1951 Convention and its Optional 
Protocol, Britain has only pledged to accept 20,000 refugees over the course 
of five years.130 
The UK’s Immigration Act of 1971, and the Immigration Rules, create 
the statutory basis for immigration law in the United Kingdom.131 Yet, these 
laws are “fluid” and “change frequently.”132 This is significant because 
changing opinion often coincides with changing refugee policy. For in-
stance, the United Kingdom saw a drastic increase in the number of refugees 
entering the country in the early 2000s. In 2002, the number of refugees 
peaked with 84,132 cases filed. 133 The Parliament reacted by increasing the 
difficulty of gaining refugee and asylum status in the United Kingdom and 
decreasing the benefits allotted to each group.134 The United Kingdom has 
also restricted the geographical areas where refugees and asylum seekers can 
live, thus concentrating them into peripheral provinces. For instance, the two 
areas with the highest number of refugees coincide with the nation’s poorest 
districts.135 The United Kingdom also passed the Refugee or Person in Need 
of International Protection Regulations in 2006, which amended the defini-
tion of a refugee from the 1951 Convention. The policy expanded on the 
definition outlined in the 1951 Convention, adding that a refugee must have 
no reasonable grounds to be considered a national threat where subsequent 
refusal of his application would force him to leave to an area where he 
would be threatened.136 These policy changes had startling results—in 2010, 
the number of cases filed dropped to 17,916.137 Applicants who are success-
ful in their claim for refugee status gain permission to reside in the United 
Kingdom for a period of at least five years, with access to welfare benefits 
and the right to work.138 
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In response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the United Kingdom devel-
oped a new program to address Syrian refugees seeking asylum and refugee 
status in the United Kingdom. The new program, the Syrian Vulnerable Per-
sons Refugee Scheme, allows particularly vulnerable Syrians, such as those 
who are “victims of sexual violence and torture, the elderly, and the disa-
bled” to come to the United Kingdom.139 Previously, the United Kingdom’s 
policy was to continue to provide humanitarian aid to Syria and the sur-
rounding countries. As a testament to their donor capability, the United 
Kingdom is the second largest humanitarian donor to Syria and the sur-
rounding region, donating approximately $1.85 billion per year to aid refu-
gees.140 
The Syrian Vulnerable Persons Refugee Scheme was expanded on Sep-
tember 7, 2015, to accept 20,000 Syrian refugees in the country over the 
next five years.141 The program only applies to refugees who are in Syria 
and the surrounding areas and does not consider refugees who are already in 
Europe or are a part of another program. The program selects refugees from 
a predetermined list provided by the UNHCR. Upon recommendation from 
the UNHCR, the Home Office will conduct further checks on eligibility and 
place refugee applicants into a suited internal program for resettlement.142 
While the United Kingdom has made significant policy changes to ac-
commodate an influx in refugees and has remained one of the largest donors 
in support of refugees, increasing anti-refugee public sentiment poses a po-
tential threat to future UK policies. One of the principal reasons for the Brit-
ish referendum in support of leaving the European Union was a fear that the 
European Union was incapable of managing the refugee crisis, placing the 
United Kingdom at a security risk.143 
3. Germany 
Unlike many of its European partners, Germany opened its doors to 
more than 890,000 refugees in August 2015.144 It was among 29 nations 
accepting Syrian refugees at the time, but was one of the few that did not 
place limits on the numbers it was willing to accept.145 
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Germany is a party to both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Optional 
Protocol.146 Its international commitment to asylum is incorporated into its 
federal law. Specifically, Article 16a of Germany’s Basic Law states that the 
right to asylum is a constitutional right granted to everyone fleeing “political 
persecution.”147 In addition, Germany has implemented two acts concerning 
the status of refugees—the Asylum Act, which codifies the process and con-
sequences of granting and denying asylum, and the Residence Act, which 
provides the rules concerning the entry, stay, exit, and employment of for-
eigners. According to German law, an asylum seeker is allowed to stay in 
Germany so long as he or she is granted political asylum, refugee status, or 
subsidiary protection.148 
In August 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged to provide 
refuge to anyone fleeing Syria or persons seeking protection from violence 
and warfare elsewhere.149 Chancellor Merkel’s “open door” policy was mod-
ified in February 2016, when the German government passed the Asylum 
Procedures Acceleration Act, also known as “Asylpaket II,” which was de-
signed to accelerate the asylum process in Germany and reform integration 
policies for refugees.150 Under Asylpaket II, more Syrians were able to at-
tend hearings and it became apparent that many were fleeing civil war and 
not actual persecution. As a result, many Syrian refugees now receive sub-
sidiary protection instead of full asylum.151 Subsidiary protection is granted 
to those who cannot show that they have been personally persecuted, such as 
those fleeing general situations like civil war. Although Germany will not 
send Syrians nationals back to their war-torn country, persons only entitled 
to subsidiary protection status receive a renewable one-year-permit and are 
required to wait two years before being allowed to bring their families to 
Germany.152 According to Die Linke, an opposition party in Germany’s par-
liament, a total of 43,300 Syrians have appealed their status decisions in 
hopes of being recognized as a refugee.153 
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C. North America and Beyond 
Most countries are geographically separated from the Syrian conflict, 
thus spared from the influx of refugees seen in the states of first asylum in 
the Middle East and later in Europe. In recognition of the heavy burden 
placed upon certain countries, other states are bound to cooperate toward a 
“satisfactory solution.”154 Unfortunately, there has been limited international 
burden-sharing of refugee resettlement. Some countries have accepted mod-
est amounts, but many countries have not agreed to accept any Syrian refu-
gees for resettlement. This list below discusses the immigration policies of 
Canada and the United States. Afterwards, notable countries that are cur-
rently not accepting Syrian refugees will be discussed briefly. 
1. Canada 
Similar to Britain and Germany, Canada has a longstanding history of 
commitment and compliance with international refugee law. Canada is party 
to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Internally, Canada has adopt-
ed numerous statutes, which create a robust refugee and asylum system 
where almost 100 percent of claimants receive a formal hearing and free 
legal advice.155 
In May 2001, the Canadian Parliament passed the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act.156 It was created “to permit Canada to pursue the 
maximum social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration . . . “157 The 
current Canadian refugee system is composed of the Refugee Humanitarian 
Resettlement Program and the In-Canada Asylum Program. The Refugee 
Humanitarian Resettlement Program assists applicants who are actively 
seeking protection from areas outside of Canada. The In-Canada Asylum 
Program assists individual seeking refugee protection claims from within 
Canada.158 Unlike other countries, private organizations play an important 
role in refugee resettlement in Canada, through programs such as the Spon-
sorship Agreement Holders program and Groups of Five.159 These groups all 
seek to provide refugees placement and other necessities. Private sponsor-
ship helps to ease the transition of refugees from life in refugee camps to 
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normalcy in Canada. These programs also aid refugees and communities by 
decreasing the initial strain on the community from refugee placement. All 
benefits afforded to refugees underneath private programs are in addition to 
government assistance and enable Canadians to ensure protection and per-
manent housing to refugees who may not have received the opportunity.160 
In recent years, Canada has increased its refugee intake to ease the bur-
den of refugees from the Syrian Civil War and other conflicts. Between 
2005 and 2014, Canada accepted 263,702 refugees.161 Despite the rise in 
refugee acceptance, Canada still maintained a strong economy and other 
factors indicative of a thriving state. In response to the heightened severity 
of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Canada increased its acceptance of Syrian ref-
ugees in late 2015 and implemented new legislation to ameliorate the strain 
Syrian refugees placed on their already extended refugee programs. Toward 
the end of 2015, the Canadian government announced that “[Canada] would 
resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2015 and another 15,000 by 
the end of February 2016.”162 On February 29, 2016, the Canadian govern-
ment had reached their intended target. To implement this plan, Canada 
worked extensively with the UNHCR to “identify people in Jordan and Leb-
anon,” who were considered low-risk refugees, and accepted them into Can-
ada’s Resettlement Program.163 Single, unaccompanied men were excluded 
from the program, placing preference on women, children, and the disa-
bled.164 
2.  The United States 
The United States joined the international refugee regime in 1968 by 
ratifying the 1967 Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees.165 Refugee admissions and resettlement into the United States is 
authorized and governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.), 
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which was amended by the Refugee Act of 1980.166 The 1980 Act, which 
was passed to end the ad hoc approach characteristic of U.S. refugee policy 
dating back to WWII, aimed to create a uniform procedure for refugee ad-
missions and to authorize federal assistance for refugee resettlement and 
promote refugee self-sufficiency.167 
Modeled after the definition found in the 1951 Convention, a “refugee” 
is described under the I.N.A. as a person who is outside his or her country 
and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.168 
Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from outside 
the country with the help of UNHCR.169 The UNHCR has first contact with 
the refugees outside of the United States. They assess individual refugee 
claims and, in some cases, refer the case to the United States (or other na-
tions) for resettlement. In addition to interviewing refugees, the UNHCR 
collects biometric data and seeks to determine if the refugees fall into one of 
45 categories of concern.170 
Under the INA, the President has the power to determine the number of 
refugees admitted into the United States after appropriate consultation with 
Congress and prior to the new fiscal year. The President makes this determi-
nation based upon humanitarian concerns or other national security inter-
ests.171 In the case of an unforeseen refugee situation that cannot be accom-
modated by the existing ceiling, the President is also granted the power to 
fix a number of refugees that may be admitted during the succeeding period 
in response to that emergency.172 Conversely, the INA also grants the Presi-
dent the power to suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as 
immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any re-
strictions he may deem to be appropriate, if he finds that the entry of any 
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aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to 
the interests of the United States.173 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United 
States refugee program was significantly updated to ensure national security 
despite the fact that none of the attackers had entered the country as a refu-
gee.174 Refugee admissions were suspended pending a review of refugee-
related security procedures and implementation of enhanced security 
measures.175 As an obvious result, United States refugee admissions plum-
meted from 70,000 in fiscal year 2001 to historic lows. In fiscal year 2002, 
for example, refugee admissions totaled a mere 27,131.176 Admissions sub-
sequently rebounded with resettlements nearing the 70,000 ceiling set for 
fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015.177 
By mid-2015, the Syrian Refugee crisis had reached the shores of Eu-
rope, with an estimated 350,000 seeking refuge beyond the camps of Jordan, 
Turkey, and Lebanon.178 Under significant pressure from the international 
community to assist with resettlement, President Barack Obama vowed to 
take in at least 10,000 displaced Syrians over the next year. He issued a 
Presidential Determination increasing the refugee ceiling to 85,000179 and by 
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August 29, 2016 the United States accepted its 10,000th Syrian refugee one 
month ahead of schedule.180 Vowing to do more in 2017, President Obama 
increased the fiscal year 2017 ceiling to 110,000 in his September 28, 2016 
Presidential Declaration.181 By December of 2016, the United States was on-
track to reach the 2017 ceiling, with an estimated 26,000 refugees having 
been accepted during the first quarter.182 
After taking office in January 2017, President Trump exercised his 
powers under 1182(f).183 On January 30, 2017, he issued an order calling for 
a 90-day travel ban for persons coming from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Somalia, Su-
dan, Yemen and Libya. Specifically relevant to refugees, the order placed a 
120 day suspension on acceptance of all refugees regardless of origin and an 
indefinite suspension on refugees traveling from Syria.184 It also reduced the 
fiscal year 2017 ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000.185 After significant political 
backlash and legal action, he issued a revised order on March 6, 2017. The 
new order retained the 120-day suspension on refugees, but it removed the 
indefinite suspension for Syrian refugees. Additionally, the order also re-
tained the reduction in the fiscal year ceiling and limited the number of ac-
cepted refugees to 50,000.186 At the time the order was issued, the United 
States had accepted 37,027 refugees; 5,557 of those refugees were Syrian.187 
Now that the 120-day suspension has been lifted, the United States will open 
its doors for a mere 12,973 refugees in the remainder of the fiscal year. 
While critics complain that the United States, the United Kingdom, or 
even Canada should do more to help the Syrian refugees, it must be noted 
that those countries have at least opened their doors to some refugees. Most 
countries across the globe, including some of the wealthiest, have not done 
the same. For example, Japan was the second largest contributor of financial 
support to the UNHCR in 2014, donating the equivalent of $181.6 mil-
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lion.188 Despite its significant financial contribution, Japan only accepted six 
Syrian asylum seekers who made it to Japan and not a single refugee for 
resettlement from the states of first asylum.189 Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe justified his country’s inaction by explaining that Japan needed 
to look after its own citizens first.190 Similarly, Russia has contributed to 
military action in Syria, but it has offered zero resettlement places for Syrian 
refugees. Russian officials unapologetically explained that receiving Syrian 
refugees is simply not on the Russian agenda.191 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PATCHWORK OF STATE REFUGEE LAWS AND 
POLICIES 
“EXPRESSING the wish that all States, recognizing the social and hu-
manitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within 
their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension 
between States . . .”192 
The Syrian refugee crisis has trampled the Middle East, cost thousands 
of innocent lives, exhausted the resources of neighboring states and dam-
aged the foundation of the European Union. Despite the devastating toll on 
humanity and potential for disastrous results, many nations cling to state 
sovereignty and national security to justify their opposition to more gener-
ous refugee resettlement policies, while other nations have opened their bor-
ders, at times encouraging thousands of asylum seekers to move through 
Europe with little, if any, screening. Ultimately, both approaches pose a 
significant threat to international security by allowing some states to become 
overwhelmed and encouraging irregular migration to surge and extremist 
rhetoric to flourish. 
A. Overburdened States of First Asylum 
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are stretched beyond the limits of their 
resources. The infrastructure, including water, sewage, electricity, and edu-
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cation, of these states is overwhelmed.193 As a direct consequence of the 
overcrowding and limited financial opportunities in the first line states, the 
refugees have naturally begun migrating to Europe in large numbers. Since 
2015, Germany has opened its doors to more than 1,000,000 refugees, not 
only from Syria, but from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Eritrea. Greece was over-
run by more than 800,000 Syrian refugees in 2016. Italy is overwhelmed 
with refugees escaping persecution and failed states in Africa.194 The num-
ber of refugees is staggering, leaving the host nations on the brink of disrup-
tion to their political order.195 Given the sheer number of refugees in their 
territories, countries are struggling to ensure refugees receive adequate pro-
tection afforded under the 1951 Convention or UDHR.196 Further adding to 
the instability, tensions between the local populations and the refugees is on 
the rise, and many states are opting to close their borders. 
1. Human Rights Concerns 
Many, and perhaps most, of the Syrian refugees are living in desperate 
conditions, even those who have made it to Europe. The United Nations 
estimates that only one out of every ten Syrian refugees lives in a refugee 
camp, leaving the rest to settle in foreign and unfamiliar environments.197 
Their locations vary, spanning from cities to towns, urban to rural areas. Out 
of camp, refugees are faced with a range of shelter conditions, and varied 
access to services. In Lebanon, for example, many refugees live in informal 
settlements in crude shelters with limited access to water and sanitation ser-
vices. Of particular concern to human rights organizations, many of those 
refugees are living in flood zones and or unstable areas with the potential for 
conflict.198 Their precarious circumstances make them highly susceptible to 
protective risks and economic pressures.199 
 
 193. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., THE UNITED STATES AND THE SYRIAN REFUGEE 
CRISIS: A PLAN OF ACTION (2016). 
 194. Id. at 3. 
 195. Id. at 8. 
 196. Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey do not have legal obligations to the Syrian refu-
gees pursuant to the 1951 Convention or the Optional Protocol; however, they are bound to 
protect the fundamental human rights as reflected in the UDHR. The UDHR is considered to 
be a statement of customary international law. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 287, 323–24 (1995). 
 197. Mercy Corps, Quick Facts: What You Need to Know About the Syria Crisis (Mar. 9, 
2017) https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-
what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis. 
 198. JEFF CRISP ET AL., FROM SLOW BOIL TO BREAKING POINT: A REAL-TIME EVALUATION 
OF UNHCR’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEE EMERGENCY 13 (2013), 
http://www.unhcr.org/52b83e539.pdf. 
 199. Id. at 3. 
2017] SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 77 
Life in the refugee camps is not always better than in the settlements. 
By most reports, the conditions in refugee camps are deplorable. The camps 
are overcrowded and often lack running water, electricity, and other necessi-
ties,200 leaving the refugees trapped in an environment arguably worse than 
their war-torn homeland. For example, refugees at Domeez camp in Iraq 
were found to be at high risk of contracting communicable diseases such as 
measles and meningitis, due to extreme overcrowding.201 Doctors deter-
mined that camp conditions were inadequate and residents did not have ac-
cess to clean water.202 Conditions in Greek refugee camps are even more 
alarming. A recent report from the Refugee Rights Data Project indicates 
that refugees’ personal security, health, and wellbeing are at risk.203 Despite 
cold temperatures, refugees are still living in summer-weight tents, which 
pose a significant fire threat.204 Camp residents lack privacy, basic necessi-
ties, and are exposed to raw sewage.205 NGO workers also report that wom-
en and children have gone missing, probably falling victim to human traf-
fickers.206 In Jordan, camps are run by the government and the United Na-
tions, offering more structure and support than other countries, but many 
families still feel trapped in the overcrowded situation.207 
Employment opportunities for the Syrian refugees are limited by many 
of the host nations. In 2016, Turkey and Jordan finally agreed to issue Syri-
an nationals work permits, but only did so in exchange for financial aid and 
other economic benefits.208 However, employers apply for the permits on 
behalf of Syrian employees after their residency, registration, and health 
requirements are met.209 In both countries, employers agree to pay minimum 
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wage and social security payments, and to renew the permits annually.210 
Unfortunately, there is little incentive for the employers to take these steps 
since the majority of Syrian nationals in these countries are willing to work 
in low-skill, low-wage labor markets where the pay is below the minimum 
wage.211 As a result, a large percentage of the Syrian refugees continue to 
live in acute poverty in Turkey and Jordan.212 In Lebanon, Syrian nationals 
are obligated to pay a prohibitive fee annually to work. As a result, adults 
either do not work or work illegally, risking deportation if caught.213 
Education prospects for Syrian children in Turkey, Jordan, and Leba-
non are also grim. It is currently estimated that there are 1.5 million school-
age children among the Syrian refugee population living in the states of first 
asylum. Of that 1.5 million, only half have access to formal education.214 
While host nations have taken steps to increase refugee enrollment, barriers 
such as language difficulties, transportation, religious accommodation, child 
marriage, and child labor keep children out of the classroom.215 Alarming 
recent statistics indicate rates of child marriage among refugee girls have 
doubled from 12% to 26%.216 Child labor among out-of-school children is 
rapidly worsening—one recent survey estimates that a third of the displaced 
children have become laborers, often working illegally in dangerous envi-
ronments.217 In light of the poor prospects in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, 
many families opt to make what one writer describes as the “death voyage” 
to Europe where educational opportunities are better.218 
2. Risk of Radicalization 
Slow refugee resettlement also means many Syrian refugees will re-
main in refugee camps longer, which under the wrong conditions, increases 
the risk of radicalization. Many national security experts argue the refugee 
camps, in particular, are “incubators and recruitment centers for jihad ex-
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tremism.” 219 Fran Townsend, the former Assistant to President George W. 
Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and former Chair of the 
Homeland Security Council recently stated, “[t]o not bring the [Syrian] ref-
ugees in, right, you leave these people in desperate circumstances and you 
see the battlefield [sic] that are the refugee camps to the recruitment of ISIS, 
[and] al Qaeda over the long term.”220 In addition to evidence of Islamic 
State activity within camps, the above-mentioned human rights concerns 
increase the risk of radicalization. A recent RAND study evaluated factors 
that tend to foster radicalization and determined that six of those proved 
significant across the “worst cases” studied. Five of the six factors on their 
list are relevant to the Syrian refugee crisis including: host nation limits on 
refugees’ rights and opportunities; inadequate security in and around camps; 
overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions; poor host nation economic 
situations; and limited education opportunities.221 The longer refugees are 
confined in these camps, with substandard living conditions and poor em-
ployment prospects, the higher the risk that they may become discouraged 
and susceptible to radicalization.222 
3. Tensions with Local Population 
Initially, the response to the Syrian refugees in the first-line countries 
was welcoming and generous, especially considering that most are not party 
to the Refugee Convention.223 Unfortunately, “as the influx has continued, 
infrastructure and services for health, education, shelter, water and sanita-
tion have faced increased pressure; competition for jobs has increased and 
wages have fallen; and the cost of basic goods has risen.”224 Left un-
addressed, experts predict “the strain will feed instability and trigger more 
violence across the region, which will have consequences for U.S. national 
security.”225 These negative side-effects have fueled tensions between the 
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local population and the refugees. Sadly, a rise in xenophobic offenses has 
been documented even in the most accepting countries. For example, Ger-
many noted 3,500 attacks against refugees in 2016, up from 1,031 in 
2015.226 Of that number, 420 incidents were physical attacks upon refugees, 
including children, and 750 were acts of arson or property damage.227 
B.  Jihadist Narrative 
Experts caution that such hostility toward the refugees can be easily 
exploited by jihadists.228 The Islamic State sees the flight of Syrian refugees 
out of its controlled territory as a significant threat to the legitimacy of its 
so-called caliphate.229 They have appealed to the Syrian nationals to return 
by trying to convince them that they will be abused by the ‘infidels’ and 
forced to convert.230 Since it has failed to slow the mass exodus, the Islamic 
State is working to create a backlash against Syrian refugees in Europe and 
elsewhere.231 By using “terror as a tool,” they build upon Western fears and 
suspicions of people from Muslim countries.232 So, they attack civilians in 
the streets of Paris, Brussels, London, or Orlando. The resulting intolerance 
and xenophobia has led to immigration restrictions, which in turn has sent a 
dangerous message that Muslim refugees are unwelcomed in the West. 
State action, such as closing borders to the Syrian refugees, also rein-
forces the jihadist narrative that the West conspires to oppress Muslims 
across the world.233 As Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, David Petrae-
us, and other security experts argued in a joint letter to the U.S. Congress, 
“[c]ategorically refusing to take [refugees] only feeds the narrative of ISIS 
that there is a war between Islam and the West, that Muslims are not wel-
come in the United States and Europe, and that the ISIS caliphate is their 
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true home.”234 Anti-immigration policies provide the Islamic State with an 
opportunity to fill the void and advance its agendas across the region,235 add-
ing more fuel to the jihadist propaganda machine, and allowing them to lure 
new followers.236 “If anything it’s going to antagonize the narratives of ter-
rorists. They’re going to use this as further indication that we have a war 
with Islam, and they’ll use that for marketing purposes.”237 
C. Irregular Migration 
In addition to the dangers posed by overburdened nations and actions 
that feed into the jihadist narrative, another significant danger to individual, 
state, and international security is the irregular migration that is encouraged, 
in part, by inconsistent immigration policies. While there is no universally 
accepted definition of irregular migration, the term is often used to charac-
terize “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of sending, 
transit and receiving countries.”238 
Denying legal migration allows human traffickers access to vulnerable 
persons, it increases crossing deaths, and makes it difficult for states to iden-
tify persons seeking admission into their territory.239 Hundreds of thousands 
of Syrians desperate for better conditions have made the dangerous journey 
to Europe. To do so, it is estimated that almost 90% of the refugees paid 
criminals or smugglers to get them across borders, bypassing lawful chan-
nels.240 Thousands have not survived the journey. In August of 2015, the 
bodies of 71 people believed to be Syrian nationals were found in an aban-
doned truck in Austria, and at least 300 were feared dead after trying to 
cross the rough seas of the Mediterranean in February of 2016.241 Those who 
survive the irregular migration journey frequently report being victims of 
exploitation, violence, or abuse by their traffickers.242 
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By 2015, European states determined that trying to stop the relentless 
flow of Syrian asylum-seekers was futile and harmful. Led by Germany, 
members of the EU worked together to allow the unscreened masses to pro-
ceed to the countries in which they wanted to seek asylum.243 By the end of 
that year, it was estimated that more than one million refugees had arrived in 
Europe by way of sea routes or the Balkans crossing.244 Instead of regulating 
the flow, entry states accelerated refugee travel with little to no screening to 
other countries like Germany, where the borders were open to an unlimited 
number of asylum-seekers. While most of the refugees were simply trying to 
get to a safe place, the poorly regulated flow made it easy for potential ji-
hadists to get onto European soil undetected.245 DW, a German news agen-
cy, indicates that members of the Islamic State have “explored and exploit-
ed” the Balkan route into Europe, including two of the assailants in the Paris 
attacks.246 
In 2016, EU support for the uncontrolled migration waned as hostility 
toward the refugees increased. Many countries, including Hungary, Serbia, 
Macedonia, and Austria began building fences to slow the influx of refugees 
into their countries.247 In March 2016, the EU abruptly changed course and 
negotiated an agreement with Turkey to stop refugees from moving onward 
into Europe in exchange for significant financial support.248 Unfortunately, 
that agreement failed to close the border and refugees again have to pay 
smugglers to get them across borders. 
Frustrated with restrictive policies, many refugees have begun protest-
ing and, in some cases, resorted to violence. In Greece, one man set himself 
ablaze to protest the deplorable living conditions.249 In Jordan, protests 
commonly occur in the Zaatari refugee camp over poor conditions. In the 
same camp, a refugee was killed during a riot that occurred after police ar-
rested a group of refugees who were trying to leave the camp. In Bulgaria, 
refugees clashed with police after their refugee center was sealed off follow-
ing reports alleging outbreaks of disease among camp residents.250 The new-
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ly constructed walls and changing immigration policies of overwhelmed 
countries have only served to make the situation more volatile. All of the 
resulting tension reinforces the jihadist narrative. The Syrian refugee crisis 
proves the international refugee regime is inadequate in the face of large 
scale forced migrations. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 1951 
CONVENTION 
On the Status of Refugees 
“CONSIDERING that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy  
burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a prob-
lem of which the United Nations has recognized the international-scope 
and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-
operation . . .”251 
Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, re-
cently acknowledged that [Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon] “are crucial pillars 
of peace and stability in their regions, and with conflicts and terrorism 
threatening to spill across borders, they de facto form the first line of de-
fense for our collective security.”252 After five years of carrying the unduly 
heavy burden, it is unrealistic to expect that the states of first asylum in the 
Middle East, and now a handful in Europe, can continue to absorb the seem-
ingly endless flow of refugees. Humanitarian aid and financial support from 
countries like Japan253 does not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem, 
especially given the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis. The rest of the 
international community must share the burden of refugee resettlement, hu-
manitarian admission, and family reunification.254 
Over the last seventy years, the world has seen horrific refugee situa-
tions unfold, yet no legal mechanism exists to allocate burden-sharing re-
sponsibilities among states. Burden-sharing, the process by which a third 
country affords refugees permanent residence and rights similar to nation-
als,255 is only done on a voluntary basis. Given the voluntary nature, interna-
tional resettlement has fallen below the need identified by the UNHCR. In 
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2015, for example, the UNHCR identified 1.1 million refugees for resettle-
ment, but it only had the ability to process resettlement submissions for 
59,563 of those refugees.256 The UNHCR also reported that there are ap-
proximately 7.2 million refugees living in a protracted refugee situation, 
which means they have been in exile for five or more years without the hope 
of a durable solution.257 Based on these numbers from 2015, voluntary reset-
tlement commitments from states, it would take more than 87 years to reset-
tle all refugees currently eligible for resettlement. 
Voluntary burden-sharing is not a sufficient solution. The world needs 
a Second Optional Protocol establishing a predictable and equitable burden-
sharing agreement among states. Fortunately, there is some international 
momentum moving toward a binding burden-sharing agreement. In 2000 at 
the Millennium Summit and again in 2016 at the UN Summit for Refugees 
and Migrants, world leaders acknowledged a collective responsibility to 
protect refugees around the world. 
A.  Millennium Declaration 
In September of 2000, leaders of the international community gathered 
at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations to set the international 
agenda for the twenty-first century. The most important result was the crea-
tion of the Millennium Declaration, a document that reaffirmed states’ faith 
in the United Nations and recognized a collective responsibility to uphold 
human dignity, equality, and equity.258 Article VI of the Declaration reflects 
the states’ commitment to protect the vulnerable from the “consequences of 
natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emer-
gencies” and “are given every assistance and protection so that they can 
resume normal life as soon as possible.”259 Pursuant to that objective, the 
states resolved to “strengthen international cooperation, including burden 
sharing in, and the coordination of humanitarian assistance to, countries 
hosting refugees and to help all refugees and displaced persons to return 
voluntarily to their homes, in safety and dignity and to be smoothly reinte-
grated into their societies.”260 Despite agreeing to share the burden that refu-
gees place upon hosting countries, the states did not provide specific instruc-
tion on how that should be done. 
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B. New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants 
In September 2016, members of the international community met at the 
UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. That event marked the first time the 
General Assembly called for a summit at the head-of-state-level to discuss 
large movements of refugees and migrants.261 During that Summit, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Mi-
grants, a document expressing the “political will of world leaders to save 
lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale.”262 While the 
Declaration is not a binding agreement, it does call for the creation of a 
comprehensive refugee response (CRR) “based on the principles of interna-
tional cooperation and on burden- and responsibility-sharing. . . .”263 Specif-
ically, world leaders called upon the UNHCR, in conjunction with relevant 
states and UN agencies, to develop and initiate a CRR framework for each 
situation involving large movements of refugees in close coordination with 
relevant states and other UN agencies.264 While the Declaration lists ele-
ments that should be addressed in a CRR,265 it does not attempt to establish a 
mechanism allowing for the calculation of a particular state’s obligations or 
the imposition of binding obligations; instead, it relies entirely on voluntary 
commitments.266 At the Summit, the General Assembly also committed to 
adopting a global compact on refugees (GCR).267 The content of the GCR 
were not specified, but the overarching objectives are easing pressures on 
host countries; enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding-third country 
solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safe-
ty and dignity.268 
The New York Declaration has been heavily criticized. The New York 
Times reported that “after days of intense negotiations over an international 
agreement, the nations of the world on Tuesday adopted a draft that con-
tained virtually no concrete commitments to make their journeys better or 
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safer. Nor does it have any force of law.”269 The Center for Migration Stud-
ies concluded that the declaration failed to create a new framework for the 
protection of refugees and migrants around the world. Instead, they saw the 
document as no more than a reaffirmation of the status quo and in some are-
as, it actually weakened current protections.270 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, a 
former official at the United Nations refugee agency who is now a senior 
fellow at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, D.C., concluded that 
the Declaration was too focused on the present and failed to prepare for fu-
ture crises.271 
The international rhetoric pledging a commitment to international co-
operation and burden-sharing have done little to correct the disproportionate 
burden that refugees place upon states of first asylum.272 These states, which 
just happen to be located in close proximity to failed states, conflicts, or 
gross human rights violations, bear the brunt of mass movements of refu-
gees based simply upon shared borders, while countries located further away 
are under no legal obligation to assist with resettlement. Various regional 
instruments such as the EU Common European Asylum System273 could 
have significant impact among state parties, but alone, they fail to solve the 
greater international problem.274 Accordingly, a stronger mechanism in 
which parties agree upon a method of burden-sharing is overdue. The idea 
of burden-sharing is not new—scholars have struggled to resolve the issues 
created by the 1951 Convention for decades. Over the years, many ideas 
have been proposed by scholars. The following section will highlight three 
burden-sharing proposals,275 including market-based agreements, group or 
regional agreements, and soft quota agreements. While all models have 
positive and negative attributes, the authors argue that the soft-quota model 
offers the best solution to the current global refugee problem 
 
 269. Somini Sengupta, U.N. Drafts Agreement on Refugees and Migrants, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/un-united-nations-refugees-
migrants-agreement.html?_r=0. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Peter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT’L L 243, 
256–57 (1997). 
 273. Common European Asylum System is a set of laws in the EU that set out the mini-
mum standards and procedures for asylum applications. See European Commission, supra 
note 112. 
 274. Tally Kritzman-Amir, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Shar-
ing in Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 377–78 (2009). 
 275. As discussed in this section, burden-sharing refers to the physical resettlement of 
refugees in third countries. 
2017] SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 87 
1. Market-Based Quotas 
In the 1990s, Peter Schuck introduced the idea of refugee quotas and 
market trading into the dialogue.276 Under this system, Schuck proposed that 
states must agree that all ought to bear a share of temporary protection and 
that permanent resettlement must be divided proportionately based upon 
state burden-bearing capacity.277 States first determine their protective ca-
pacity. Then, based upon that determination, quotas will be assigned to par-
ticipating nations. States would then be free to buy or sell quota obliga-
tions.278 Shuck believes this plan would increase state participation and re-
sources. Using Japan as an example, one writer explains that wealthy coun-
tries with ethnically homogenous societies and historically limited protec-
tion for refugees would be inclined to pay other nations to assume their ob-
ligation.279 Under this plan, the cost of the protection system would be re-
duced by transferring protection from high-cost countries to low-cost coun-
tries. Shuck indicates an agency such as the UNHCR would have to regulate 
the system to ensure refugee rights were respected in the process.280 
For obvious reasons, applying a market-based solution to the protection 
of human beings has been viewed with skepticism.281 One author explains, 
markets create inequities and “there may be market imperfections that, while 
tolerable in the case of commodities, are unacceptable when dealing with 
human lives.”282 Others add that this approach will not foster meaningful 
burden-sharing, but instead is just one more way to confine refugees to de-
veloping countries.283 
2. Group or Regional Responsibility-Sharing 
Another popular burden-sharing mechanism was proposed by James 
Hathaway and Alexander Neve in the 1990s. They argued that regional or 
group agreements to share responsibility were the most effective solution to 
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mass influx of refugees.284 Their model, which operates very much like an 
insurance scheme, calls for collective responsibility in which member coun-
tries within designated groups agree ahead of time to contribute to the pro-
tection of refugees arriving within their territory.285 Hathaway and Neve also 
maintain that the smaller group size allows for more efficient cooperation 
and creates a greater incentive for states to cooperate since the effects of a 
refugee crisis are felt locally, which also makes reaching an international 
agreement more likely.286 
Under the regional or group mechanism, a member country experienc-
ing a mass influx of refugees will not take actions to stem the flow since 
other members in the region will assist in a predetermined manner.287 One 
proponent of regional agreements highlights the EU’s asylum agreements, 
including the Dublin Accord, as a promising example of this model.288 Yet, 
the EU’s CEAS has been heavily criticized for lack of state consistency and 
unfair dealings with the Syrian refugees.289 In particular, while EU asylum 
laws do not require asylum seekers to claim asylum in the first EU country 
they reach, the Dublin Accord allows EU states to return refugees. Northern 
states have used the Dublin Accord to their advantage and returned asylum-
seekers to overcrowded southern states.290 In that sense, the EU agreements 
have disproved Hathaway and Neve’s belief that states within a regional 
agreement will cooperate honestly and take an interest in the treatment of 
refugees in other countries.291 This model is also criticized for placing a 
greater burden upon developing nations and for creating an incentive for 
countries with similar resources and risks to reach agreements to the exclu-
sion of poor countries.292 
3. Soft Quotas 
In many ways, the countries currently willing to resettle refugees loose-
ly follow the soft quota model proposed by Atle Grahl-Madsen in the late 
1970s.293 Similar to the other proposals mentioned above, Grahl-Madsen’s 
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proposal recognizes that “collective action strengthens protection for refu-
gees by reducing inequalities among receiving states.”294 Specifically, the 
“soft quota” proposal calls for equitable distribution of refugees based upon 
an index that considers individual country GNP and population density. Af-
ter countries of first asylum reach their maximum capacity, the burden-
sharing mechanism would be triggered and other countries would resettle 
refugees based upon a predetermined yearly quota. If quotas were surpassed, 
the remaining resettlements would be decided on an ad hoc basis.295 Unlike 
Hathaway and Neve’s model, quotas are not limited to regions or groups, 
but instead are spread across all states. 
Under this model, a conflict in State A causes a migration of refugees 
to State B. When State B reaches a predetermined maximum capacity, the 
international burden-sharing mechanism would be triggered, and States C 
through Z would accept a predetermined number based upon their GNP and 
population. Thus, refugees would be redistributed across many nations, not 
just those in the affected region. If this model had been applied to the Syrian 
refugee crisis, the burden on the states of first asylum and Europe would 
have been significantly reduced. As discussed, the conflict in Syria led to 
the mass migration of 5.9 million people. More than 4 million of those peo-
ple sought asylum in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, presumably well above 
those countries’ maximum capacity. Upon reaching maximum capacity (at a 
much lower predetermined threshold), Syrian refugees would have been 
distributed across the globe and not just in Europe. 
It was previously mentioned that some members of the international 
community already loosely follow the soft-quota model.296 For example, the 
United States and Canada, in coordination with the UNHCR, both accept a 
certain number of refugees each year for resettlement from states of first 
asylum.297 So why has it not worked? First, only a limited number of coun-
tries currently accept refugees for resettlement. Second, the states that do 
accept refugees for resettlement do so not based upon any binding arrange-
ment, but instead because of international pressure, sense of responsibility, 
and self-interest.298 Returning to the Syrian refugee crisis hypothetical, had 
the United States been bound to accept a specified number of refugees pur-
suant to an international agreement, it would have been more difficult for 
President Trump to abruptly reduce the number of spots for refugees in the 
United States. 
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For the soft quota proposal to work, the United Nations, its subordinate 
organizations, and member nations would need to be actively involved in 
the refugee quota determination. Since all member states are represented at 
the United Nations,299 it is an appropriate forum for international decision-
making. Additionally, if the UN is in charge of the coordination of burden-
sharing agreements, then member states would have to comply pursuant to 
their obligation to act in good-faith in support of the UN.300 
The role of the UNHCR, in particular, would need to expand. Current-
ly, the UNHCR facilitates voluntary responsibility-sharing related to refu-
gees. Pursuant to its statute as a “nonpolitical, humanitarian, and social 
body,” the UNHCR has the expertise and apolitical character that makes it 
the most appropriate entity to work with member states to determine an eq-
uitable distribution of responsibility.301 While a precise explanation of how 
the UNHCR would implement a burden-sharing mechanism is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to note that the UNHCR would have to 
oversee the process of establishing state quotas and maximum capacity 
rates. It would also need the ability to enforce agreed upon quotas.302 
Domestic and international courts would have to assist the UNHCR in 
the enforcement of responsibility sharing. The International Court of Justice 
or various regional human rights courts would be likely candidates for inter-
national adjudication, but many nations are not party to those bodies. Addi-
tionally, burden-sharing agreements are viewed as diplomatic in nature. As a 
result, may refrain from examining them.303 In either situation, domestic 
courts would have to uphold their country’s commitment to international 
burden-sharing agreements. 
Similar to other models, the soft quota proposal is not without its faults. 
For example, it requires a second migration to a new country, resulting in a 
variety of negative side-effects. Using quotas also damages immigrant 
communities which are an invaluable source of comfort and assistance to 
their members. Bureaucratically dispersing refugees from the first state of 
asylum to countries located potentially thousands of miles away will deteri-
orate immigrant communities.304 Additionally, this mechanism risks further 
human rights violations in the form of an institutionalized forced removal by 
allowing governments to transfer refugees to other states without regard to 
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the adequacy of protection they might receive.305 However, as with other 
human rights treaties, international trends pull an increasing number of 
states into the fold and into compliance. With time and international pres-
sures, countries currently unwilling to accept refugees may change their 
position 
The soft quota model is just one of many potentially viable burden-
sharing proposals. Regardless of the model chosen, the international com-
munity has a duty to come together and find a satisfactory solution to the 
world’s refugee problem. As noted by UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
António Guterres in 2015, “if there is one Protocol that is yet to be drafted 
to complement the 1951 Convention, it is one on international solidarity and 
burden sharing.”306 Though there has been significant resistance, there is 
also momentum building. The number one obstacle preventing conclusion 
of an agreement is state sovereignty, but the current refugee crisis may final-
ly be the catalyst needed to overcome that wall. 
C. Obstacles that Can Be Overcome 
There are obvious obstacles standing in the way of a new treaty impos-
ing costly duties upon states in addition to selecting and implementing an 
effective burden-sharing mechanism. One only has to look to recent reports 
from the New York Summit to see that, despite the current crisis, significant 
opposition still exists. States rarely prefer the sovereign responsibilities over 
sovereign rights,307 but history shows us that times of crisis allow for ex-
traordinary achievements. The most prominent example was the creation of 
the UN Charter. The events of World War II were so atrocious that all states 
were willing to give up some sovereign rights to “save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought un-
told sorrow to mankind.”308 Other examples include the 1977 Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which was drafted following 
the Vietnam War to prevent indiscriminate attacks against civilians, civilian 
objects, cultural objects, and the natural environment, among others.309 
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These are but two examples that show, in the right circumstances, that states 
will put humanitarian concerns above sovereign rights. 
The current refugee crisis can spur meaningful change in the interna-
tional refugee regime. Not only would participation in a burden-sharing 
agreement give states the moral high ground, it would be in their self-
interest to do so. Within this context, a burden-sharing agreement would 
operate as an insurance policy. Countries may initially incur losses in the 
short-term, but they are protected against much higher costs in the future.310 
Again, looking at the situation in Syria—had there been a burden-sharing 
agreement in place, resettlement out of the first states of asylum could have 
moved more efficiently, Europe would not have been overrun, and countries 
like Greece, Germany, and Sweden would not have been alone to carry most 
of the weight of the refugee-initiated resettlement. 
National security interests are also promoted by a binding resettlement 
agreement. First, equitable resettlement will ensure overburdened countries 
do not collapse and can preserve the availability of refugee protection in 
states of first asylum. Michael Ignatieff from the Shorenstein Center on Me-
dia, Politics and Public Policy, recently concluded “it is in America’s na-
tional interest to help Europe manage and overcome this crisis by lending 
strong political support to its major European allies, particularly Germany, 
and by re-asserting its leadership role in refugee resettlement and integra-
tion.”311 In his White Paper, Ignatieff urges the United States accept 65,000 
of the Syrian refugees to relieve pressure on the states of first asylum and to 
show solidarity with Europe who is also struggling with the influx. By doing 
so, the United States will strengthen and stabilize critical allies in both re-
gions.312 
Refugees and migrants also make important contributions in the fight 
against terrorism, which further promotes national security. For example, 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence experts 
worked extensively with immigrant communities for intelligence, and en-
listed members in counterterror efforts.313 They found that immigrant com-
munities had strong interests and incentive to cooperate and overwhelmingly 
rejected extremist ideologies and terrorism.314 
An equitable resettlement agreement also promotes international secu-
rity by encouraging legal migration, curbing the use of human smugglers, 
limiting the risk of trafficking, and making life more difficult for terrorists 
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who depend upon and often profit from smuggling networks.315 Further, a 
recent study from the World Economic Forum (WEF) cautioned that a 
“large-scale involuntary migration” poses the most likely international risk 
and is intrinsically connected to other worrisome risks, including interstate 
conflicts and state collapse.316 The WEF found that three factors increase 
threat of migration. 317 First, it determined that refugees are staying in host 
nations longer than they used to stay.318 If unable to integrate into society, 
refugees can become frustrated and more vulnerable to disenchantment and 
radicalization. Second, similar to other experts, the WEF found that the in-
ternational refugee regime is simply not able to respond to today’s challeng-
es.319 It reached this conclusion because many countries, including Syria’s 
neighbors, are not parties to the 1951 Convention, or if they are, they do not 
uphold it.320 The final factor that increases the threat to the international 
community is that most refugees move to other developing countries, where 
government systems are already weak or likely to fail.321 
Refugees can be of great benefit to their new states. In fact, refugees 
are credited with significant economic, scientific, diplomatic, cultural, and 
ethical contributions. The United States enjoyed successes from several fa-
mous immigrants, including Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Elie Weisel, 
Madeleine Albright, Andrew Grove, and Sergey Brin. The Council on For-
eign Relations’ Independent Task Force on US Immigration Policy cau-
tioned that to “keep out talented immigrants or significantly disrupt legiti-
mate cross-border traffic or commerce” would weaken “the long-term foun-
dations of America’s economy and military strength, and consequently its 
security. . . .”322 Refugees are also needed in countries like Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, which are facing rapidly aging populations, where 
“young, well-educated, and highly motivated” workers are needed to fill 
hundreds of thousands of available jobs.323 A recent study on the effects of 
80,000 Iraqi, Bosnian, and Somalian refugees in Denmark revealed that the 
presence of less-skilled refugees encouraged native workers to move up the 
employment ladder to more complex and less manually-intensive occupa-
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tions.”324 In addition, the influx of refugees can help fund a country’s wel-
fare system, which tends to become increasingly strained as more retirees 
have to be financed by fewer working-age and tax-generating citizens.325 
VI. CONCLUSION – THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS NOT READY 
FOR THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS, BUT IT CAN BE READY FOR THE 
INEVITABLE “NEXT TIME” 
“Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a con-
tinuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a 
groundswell of support around the world.”326 
The Syrian refugee crisis is but one of many crises occurring in the 
world today. The UNHCR estimates that there are currently 65.3 million 
forcibly displaced persons worldwide, 21.3 million of whom are refugees 
who escaped persecution in their homelands and sought asylum elsewhere. 
During times of conflict, regardless of location, people fleeing persecution 
will continue to travel to neighboring states to seek protection. 
The international rhetoric pledging a commitment to international co-
operation and burden-sharing have done little to correct the disproportionate 
burden that refugees place upon states of first asylum.327 These states, which 
just happen to be located in close proximity to failed states, conflicts, or 
gross human rights violations, bear the brunt of mass movements of refu-
gees based simply upon shared borders while countries located further away 
are under no legal obligation to assist with resettlement. A Second Optional 
Protocol to the 1951 Convention is needed to establish binding international 
quotas to ensure states of first asylum do not become overwhelmed and 
close their doors to humanitarian crises. 
The world’s refugees have grown impatient. Looking at the Syrian con-
flict, thousands of refugees rejected the poor conditions in the states of first 
asylum and began risking their lives for the chance at something better in 
Europe.328 They did not wait for state-sponsored resettlement—they resettled 
themselves. It is too late to catch up with the Syrian refugee crisis, but it is 
not too late to be better prepared for future crises. But to be ready, states 
must be willing to relinquish a minimal amount of sovereignty and agree to 
accept an equitable number of refugees for resettlement on an annual basis. 
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